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KOSOVO: HOW MYTHS AND TRUTHS STARTED A WAR
By Julie A. Mertus. Berkeley, University of California Press,
1999. $55.00. 378 pages.
Reviewed by Linda A. Malone*
The war in Kosovo presented a crisis of conscience for the
human rights community specifically and the world community
generally. No aspect of the crisis could be neatly categorized,
classified, or characterized. Was Kosovo simply part of
Yugoslavia, or was it autonomous? Was NATO's campaign
authorized in any way by the Security Council, or not? Was it a
regional enforcement action or collective humanitarian
intervention? Was there a humanitarian crisis, or did the
bombing campaign create one? Was Milosevic's campaign against
the ethnic Albanians a response to the bombing, or a
premeditated program? Is it genocide if the predominant intent
is removal of an ethnic population rather than its destruction? Is
humanitarian intervention without U.N. authorization even
lawful? At what point is it unlawful for a state to minimize its
own casualties at the expense of the civilian population? Have
"smart bombs" made "collateral damage" illegal under
international law? In ethnic conflicts, are critical communicators
of propaganda, such as radio stations, legitimate military
targets? If humanitarian intervention is lawful, what is its goal
and how can that goal be met without restructuring an entire
social and political structure within a state? Is humanitarian
intervention least effective in the situations in which it is needed
the most?
On June 12, 1999, the eleven-week bombing campaign by
NATO ended, and Yugoslavian forces began to leave Kosovo.'
The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1244, setting out
the political and legal structure for administration of Kosovo for
an undetermined transition period.^  With little reliable
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information on casualties or consequences, it was nevertheless
clear that the effects on Yugoslavia's infrastructure and economy
were devastating, that hundreds of thousands of Kosovar
Albanians had been displaced, and that in turn, tens of
thousands of Serbs had fied Kosovo.^  On May 27, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
indicted President Milosevic and four of his political supporters
for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo in 1999.'*
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began establishing its own
de facto governmental and administrative structure for Kosovo,
forcing the U.N. and NATO troops to take measures to disarm
the KLA and reign in their apparent attempt to assume control
during the transitional period.^ In Yugoslavian towns which had
substantial opposition to Milosevic, graffiti on the walls asked,
"Clinton in the air. Milosevic on the ground. Where is God?"^
Many scholars have struggled to define the origins of the
confiict in Kosovo. Any conflict in the Balkans immediately lends
itself to the easy conclusion that the seed of the conflict is long-
standing ethnic hatred that cannot be erased. Noel Malcolm,
among others, presents a strong case that Kosovo itself is a
relatively recent construct and that ethnic or religious hatred as
the cause seems less significant than ideological and political
manipulation.'' This conclusion is amply supported by Julie A.
Mertus, in her book Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a
War.^ Rather than focus on the high level decision makers in the
conflict. Professor Mertus examines the grass roots beliefs of
Kosovar Albanians and Serbians to determine how neighbors
learn to hate each other to the point of pursuing war and
extermination. As an experienced human rights consultant who
has worked in Kosovo since 1993,^  she includes interviews with
3. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Press
Release (visited Mar. 25, 2000) <http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p403-e.htm>.
4. See id.
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Serbians and Albanians in the region to compare and contrast
their "true" accounts of what led to the 1998 conflict. Mertus
asserts that "experience and myth are far more persuasive and
influential than factual truth." 1° Certainly that must be the case
when conflicts are concocted and promoted for political
advantage or to fulfill a politician's desire for power. The author
makes explicit what Malcolm suggests: "[T]he war in Kosovo
cannot be attributed to ancient hatreds. Rather, the conflict is
the result of recent hatreds fueled by recent propaganda
campaigns.""
In 1989, when Kosovo was stripped of its autonomous status
and became merely a province of Yugoslavia, the stage was set
for Milosevic to use Kosovo in his pursuit of power. ^ ^ The human
rights violations during this period, as much as or more than the
loss of autonomy, led to the inevitable rise of the KLA, which in
turn provided Milosevic with identifiable Albanian "terrorists" to
demonize.'^ The terrorist label attached directly to the KLA, and
indirectly to the Albanian unrest, as Professor Mertus
convincingly demonstrates, discouraged the international
community from seeking to rectify the human rights
deprivations leading to the political unrest.'"* In that sense, the
1998 conflict in Kosovo was not only predictable, but almost
preordained.
Professor Mertus examines the critical period of 1981 to
1990 through the prism of four events: the 1981 student
demonstrations, the Martinovic case, the Paracin Massacre, and
the alleged poisoning of Albanian schoolchildren. The 1981
student demonstrations at the University of Pristina sparked
Serbian fears of an Albanian revolt in Kosovo.'^  The Martinovic
case involved a Serbian peasant who suffered either a self-
inflicted anal injury or impalement with a bottle at the hands of
Albanian nationahsts, depending upon the "truth" one accepts.'^
10. Id. at 2-3 {citing PAUL A. COHEN, HISTORY IN THREE KEYS: THE BOXERS AS
EVENT, EXPERIENCE AND MYTH 3 (1997)).
11. /d. at4.
12. See id. at xvii.
13. See id. at 6-9, 228-29.
14. See id. at xi, 7-8, 278-79.
15. See id. at 32.
16. See id. at 106.
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Likewise, the Paracin Massacre in 1987 was either the apolitical
act of a disturbed soldier in the Yugoslav army or a politically
motivated massacre of four soldiers (one Serb, two Bosnian
Muslims, one Slovene and Croat) by an Albanian terrorist.^^ In
March of 1990, press reports of Albanian school children
becoming mysteriously ill en masse led to rumors that Serbians
were poisoning the Albanian children.** Without minimizing the
need to investigate and determine what actually occurred in each
of these situations. Professor Mertus contends that the
perceptions of each side are equally important to an
understanding of how the crisis in Kosovo developed. *^  The
interviews she includes are compelling in demonstrating the
escalating frenzy of fear, then paranoia, and ultimately hatred,
these myths and truths engendered.
It is no coincidence that Milosevic's political power increased
as the Kosovo confrontation intensified.^^ Milosevic consohdated
his power within the Communist Party whUe appealing to the
nationalists with his call for Serbian unity.^i His emblem was
Kosovo, which he proclaimed in 1998 to be "a love that eternally
warms [the] heart" of the Serbian nation.^ ^ From there, the
Kosovar Albanians became an inevitable target of his campaign
of hatred.2^
One of the more interesting and useful aspects of Mertus's
book is the chapter devoted to the lessons non-governmental
organizations (NGOs), particularly human rights organizations,
can draw from how the Kosovo conflict arose.^ -* There are two
aspects of this guidance: how to rectify the distrust and hatred
engendered by these truths and myths and how to prevent future
conflicts when public perception is being manipulated precisely
for the purpose of creating intrastate strife. To some extent, her
message is a strikingly simple one: Human rights workers on the
17. See id. at 153.
18. See id. at 187-91.
19. Seeid. at 252.
20. See id. at 176.
21. Seeid.
22. Id. at 178-179 (citing LAURA SiLBER & ALLAN LITTLE. THE DEATH OF
YUGOSLAVIA 66 (1995) (quoting Milosevic)).
23. See id. at 178-81.
24. See id. at 253-^61.
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scene and decision makers in their often extensive supra-
structure must listen to the voices of the groups in conflict before
structuring any mechanisms for support or relief.25 When
distrust is being promoted by any individual or entity for
political purposes, NGOs may be the only intermediaries who
can communicate effectively with the manipulated groups during
or after the conflict. Reconstruction of a civil society cannot be
accomplished until the rhetoric of hatred is extinguished, or
more probably, counteracted. Only when effective methods are
found for countering the rhetoric is there any hope of preventing
such conflicts before they even occur.
Professor Mertus's book was published before the NATO
bombing campaign began.26 The intelligent analysis and
thoughtful insights in her book as to the causes of the conflict
beg the unanswered question of how she would evaluate the
remedy of a bombing campaign for the human rights violations
and Milosevic's abuse of power. For many human rights
advocates, the bombing campaign brought to mind the maxim
that warns "be careful what you wish for—you just might get it."
For many years, the legality of humanitarian intervention
by force under international law was largely an academic debate,
exemplified by the competing articles of Richard Lillich and Ian
Brownlie.2'' The historical precedents, critical to the
determination of whether custom recognized such intervention,
were murky and complicated by the difficulty of assessing a
state's true motivation in situations of clearly mixed
justifications. However, with the Security Council's resolutions
and intervention to protect the Kurds in Iraq28 and deliver
humanitarian reUef in Somalia,29 the precedents for
humanitarian intervention by the Council premised on a "threat
25. See id.
26. See id. at xi.
27. See Ian Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW .-VND CIVIL WAR IN
THE MODERN WORLD 217 (John Norton Moore ed.. 1974); Richard Lillich,
Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive
Alternatives, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD, supra, at 229.
28. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688
(1991).
29. S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/794
(1992).
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to the peace"3o were clearly established under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter.^i As the Security Council was
reactivated, the numerous questions concerning the legality of
and criteria for humanitarian intervention by a state or group of
states without Security Council authorization were echpsed by
defining the limits of peace-building as opposed to peacemaking.
The NATO bombing campaign thrust all those questions to
the forefront of political, legal, and social discourse. With the
possible exception of an Entebbe-like rescue operation, is
humanitarian intervention inevitably a disproportionate use of
force? In measuring proportionality, how can the destruction
from bombs or the intrusion of troops be balanced against a mass
exodus of refugees or the effects of apartheid? On April 29, 1999,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia filed a petition against the
United States and nine other NATO members in the
International Court of Justice.^^ In every way possible, the Court
expressed concern over this use of force, but dismissed the
petition for lack of jurisdiction.^^ Submissions by individuals and
groups to Louise Arbour, prosecutor for the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, are not as easily
dismissed.^ * If the humanitarian warriors had spent $500 million
a day on rehef efforts instead of bombs, there would have been a
very different solution to the Kosovo crisis, although not
necessarily a better one. The lives of the Kosovar Albanians
would be better, but they would in all likelihood be living their
lives outside of Kosovo.
Ultimately, the strongest justification for humanitarian
intervention is the moral imperative that certain humanitarian
30. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
31. Seeid.
32. See International Court of Justice. Press Communiques (visited Mar. 25.
2000) <http://www.u-paris2.fr/cij/icjwww/ipressconi/iprpenyall.html>.
33. See generally Intemational Court of Justice. List of All Decisions and
Advisory Opinions Brought Before the Court Since 1946 (visited Mar. 25. 2000)
<http://www.u-paris2.fr/cij/icjwww/idecisions.htm>. The court held that it had no
basis for jurisdiction over Spain and the United States. See International Court of
Justice. Press Communique 99/33, (visited Mar. 25. 2000) <http://www.u-
paris2.fr/cij/icjwww/idocket/iyus/iyusframe.htm>. For the remaining eight states it
concluded it lacked prima facie jurisdiction but remained seized of those cases.
' 34. See International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Statement
by Justice Louise Arbor, Prosecutor ICTY (visited Mar. 25. 2000)
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p404-e.htm>.
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crises mandate that something be done by someone. If the
Security Council, whatever its potential powers may be, fails to
act, the moral crise de la conscience cannot be avoided. Without
forceful intervention, the atrocities in Lubljana, Vukovar,
Dubrovnik, Sarajevo, Srebrenica, and Kosovo seemed certain to
continue. The hopefully good intentions behind humanitarian
intervention, however, do not serve as legal justifications. There
are legal justifications for limiting humanitarian intervention to
the U.N. Charter mechanisms, which are grounded in curbing
the excesses and abuses that often accompany intervention by
force. Limiting humanitarian intervention to that authorized by
the Security Council could very well be the legal and moral
outcome, even if it means that some serious human rights
violations will not be rectified. The human rights community (in
the broadest sense) must engage in serious self-examination.
Human rights advocacy and abhorrence of violence are natural
corollaries. Ironically, the hawks of humanitarian intervention
today looking outside the Charter for legal justification include
many of the doves of earlier interstate conflicts who urged strict
adherence to the terms of the Charter for justification of the use
of armed force. Human rights advocates cannot afford the
appearance of hypocrisy. As the bombing and so-caUed collateral
damage escalated during the campaign, the oxymoron of
humanitarian war made the humanitarian warriors look less
like humanitarians and more like warriors. By June 18, 1999,
when NATO troops entered Kosovo, the most immediate
beneficiaries of their presence were the KLA leaders.
If the war merely substitutes one group of ethnic
nationalists for another, it will be a humanitarian failure, if it is
not already one. NATO soon found itself presented with a new
set of myths designed to ensure that there would be no return to
a mixed society. Fictitious lists of suspected Serbian war
criminals were being circulated in Kosovo, some issued under the
name of the KLA and local self-declared ethnic Albanian police
units.35 A NATO spokesman said the lists seemed designed to
heighten the Serbian population's fears and encourage violence
from the Albanians.^ G The episode seemed a quintessential
35. See NATO Fears New Kosovo Violence, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Oct. 21,
1999, at 15.
36. See id.
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example of the dangers of manipulative myth-making by political
demagogues.
Professor Mertus's book is a cautionary tale for the future of
Kosovo. If there is any chance that Serbians will coexist with
Albanians in Kosovo, their perceptions of each other will
determine what happens to Kosovo more than anything else. If
they cannot trust each other, the monumental task of building
trust will fall on the shoulders of the human rights community,
the moral authority of which has been badly shaken by the
bombing campaign. Lawyers and academics can continue to
debate the legal ambiguities of humanitarian intervention, but
human rights workers must explain to the people how destroying
a society was necessary to save it.
